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PERSONS
Robert A. Pascal*
DIVORCE
The case of Davidson v. Helm1 requires careful comment on
its decision, dictum, and implications, both on the basis of in-
ternal Louisiana law and on that of federal constitutional law.
The facts are simple. An estranged Mississippi domiciliary wife
sued her Louisiana domiciliary husband at his parish domicile
for divorce under Revised Statutes 9:301. This legislation is as
follows:
"When married persons have been living separate and
apart for a period of two years or more, either party to the
marriage contract may sue, in the courts of his or her resi-
dence within this state, provided such residence shall have
been continuous for the period of two years, for an abso-
lute divorce, which shall be granted on proof of the con-
tinuous living separate and apart of the spouses, during the
period of two years or more."
The trial judge dismissed the suit, so the appellant's brief 2 and
the majority opinion state, apparently because he did not be-
lieve the legislation permitted a non-domiciliary plaintiff to sue
for such a divorce in Louisiana. The majority of the Supreme
Court, Justices Hawthorne and McCaleb dissenting, reversed the
trial judge and allowed the divorce. This decision is without
doubt erroneous in its interpretation of Revised Statutes 9:301;
it repeats grave errors committed in the decision of Wreyford v.
Wreyford and Latham v. Latham,4 decided in the 1949-50 term;
it resulted in a judgment which, it is submitted, is not entitled
to full faith and credit in any other state, and which, the writer
believes, is not valid under the United States Constitution.
The rationale of the majority's opinion seems to be as fol-
lows:
(1) Revised Statutes 9:301 establishes two years separa-
tion in fact as a ground for divorce so long as either
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 759, 63 So. 2d 866 (1953).
2. Brief for Appellant, p. 4.
3. 216 La. 784, 44 So. 2d 867 (1950).
4. 216 La. 791, 44 So. 2d 870 (1950).
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
plaintiff or defendant has been domiciled in the same
Louisiana parish during the two years preceding suit.
(2) Revised Statutes 9:301 authorizes the plaintiff, if he or
she be a domiciliary of Louisiana, to file suit in the par-
ish of his or her domicile, but this venue is not ex-
clusive, and the plaintiff, whether or not a domiciliary
of Louisiana, may sue for divorce under the general
rules on this subject.
(3) The general law on divorce venue allows the plaintiff
to sue
(a) in the parish of the defendant's domicile, or
(b) in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile.
That the general law on divorce venue allows the plain-
tiff to sue (a) in the parish of the defendant's domicile or (b)
in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile is an incorrect
statement of the Louisiana law on the subject. It was first so
stated in Wreyford v. Wreyford5 (1950) and the incorrectness
of this statement was pointed out both by the writer in the
symposium article on the work of the Supreme Court during
the 1949-50 term6 and by a Louisiana State University Law
School student in a comment appearing shortly thereafter.
7
There is no need to repeat the demonstrations here. Those
who are sufficiently interested will be able to read those docu-
ments. Suffice it here to say that whereas under the general law
a divorce suit may be brought in the parish of the defendant's
domicile,8 there cannot be suit at the "last matrimonial domi-
cile" for the simple reason there is no authorization in the legis-
lation for any such venue.
Whether Revised Statutes 9:301, in allowing the plaintiff to
sue in the parish of his "residence," establishes an exclusive or an
additional venue for such divorce suits is of no importance as
long as both parties are domiciliaries of the state (as in the Wrey-
ford decision); in such a suit there can be no question of the
judgment rendered being entitled to full faith and credit or con-
sidered invalid under the United States Constitution. Thus it
was that in commenting on the Wreyford decision in a previous
5. 216 La. 784, 44 So. 2d 867 (1950).
6. 11 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 168-171 (1951).
7. Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 210, 220 (1952).
8. Art. 162, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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symposium the writer did not feel compelled to state his views
on the subject and refrained from so doing.9 For reasons which
will appear below, the writer regards the judgment in the
Davidson case, under discussion, as neither entitled to full faith
and credit nor valid, and inasmuch as the rationale of the deci-
sion is based on the interpretation of Revised Statutes 9:301,
he now feels compelled to give his appraisal of that interpre-
tation. In this matter he is completely in accord with the dis-
senting justices and finds the opinion of Justice McCaleb too
clear and convincing to warrant further discussion here.
The real tragedy of the decision, however, is that, if the
writer's conclusions in the matter are correct, the judgment
rendered is neither entitled to full faith and credit nor valid
under the United States Constitution. In a student comment
appearing in this issue the opinion is expressed that a state
may entertain a divorce suit and apply its laws only if the plain-
tiff is domiciled in that state.10 The writer believes this opinion
is correct and therefore considers the judgment in the Davidson
case not entitled to full faith and credit in other states.
Beyond that, however, the judgment must be considered
invalid under the United States Constitution. Though it was
once accepted generally, and indeed even now maintained by
many, that the norms for recognition and validity are dissimilar
and that a decision may be valid in the state where rendered and
yet not entitled to recognition, that view no longer can be main-
tained. Very recent research has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution was meant to and does give to the federal govern-
ment complete control in the field of the conflict of laws.1 ' This
being so, a state can have neither legislative jurisdiction nor judi-
cial competence where the conflict of laws rules which might be
enacted by Congress or applied by the United States Supreme
Court would deny it. If, as the writer contends, the conflicts law
applied by the United States Supreme Court implies that only
the domicile of the plaintiff will give a state legislative and
judicial competence in a divorce suit, the judgment in the
Davidson suit is not only not entitled to full faith and credit but
is also invalid under the necessary implication of the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
9. 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 168, 170 (1951).
10. See Comment, infra p. 257.
11. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 547-557 (1953).
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Proof of Adultery
Three decisions dealt with proof of adultery as a ground
for divorce. In two of these, Feazel v. Feazel- and Arbour v.
Murray,18 it was said that testimony of the defendant confess-
ing adultery is admissible evidence, but insufficient without cor-
roboration to constitute proof of the act. Previous decisions to
the same effect were cited, but it would have been well for the
court to note that the same principle which is sanctioned in
our legislation forbidding the granting of divorces on the face
of pleadings, that is to say, the admission in the answer of the
defendant, 14 warrants the. conclusion reached in these cases.
In this way the court would have been basing its judgment on
the legislation, as it should be in a civil law system, rather than
on their own previous decisions. Although there is a difference
between accepting at face value an admission in an answer
and giving full credence to a confession in open court, in that
the court has the opportunity to test the veracity of the witness
in the second but not in the first, there is, nevertheless, in both
instances the factor that it would be too easy to obtain a divorce
by collusion and thereby prejudice the interest of society in
maintaining the marital relation except where legal cause exists.
Ultimately the reason for the rule is the doubtful credibility of
such testimony, and the doubt is so reasonable that if such
testimony is to be admitted at all it should at least be cor-
roborated by other evidence. This is the intent and the effect
of these two decisions.15
Similarly, in the third decision involving proof of adultery,
Estopinal v. Estopinal,16 the Supreme Court quite correctly ruled
admissible a paramour's testimony as to the fact of the adul-
tery. Here again credibility is the prime consideration. If there
is reason to suspect the credibility of the witness, of course the
testimony should be corroborated, and it was in this case; but
it does not seem to the writer that such a person's testimony
should be suspected merely because he or she is the paramour.
12. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
13. 222 La. 684, 63 So. 2d 425 (1953).
14. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601 (4).
15. The writer's agreement with the law as interpreted in the decisions
discussed does not imply his agreement with court's findings of fact in
Feazel v. Feazel, so far as they relate to the existence of evidence to
corroborate the confession of adultery. On this point see the comments
infra p. 125.
16. 66 So. 2d 311 (La. 1953).
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In that respect the testimony of a defendant spouse properly can
be treated differently from that of an accomplice. Nevertheless,
it must be observed that because adultery is the only ground
for immediate divorce it is open to abuse through collusion and
great care must be exercised by the trial judge in evaluating
the truth or falsity of the testimony offered in such cases.
SEPARATION
The appeals presented in separation cases require little
discussion. In Glorioso v. Glorioso1 7 the issue was whether the
acts of the plaintiff husband constituted such cruel treatment as
to justify the wife's departure from the marital home. The
question in Schaneville v. Schaneville8 was whether the conduct
of the plaintiff wife was such provocation as to excuse the
husband for the acts charged to him as cruelty. In Rainwater
v. Brown9 the existence or non-existence of reconciliation and
relative fault were the facts at issue. In all three cases the judg-
ments of the lower courts were affirmed, as they should have
been. It may be well to note, however, that in the last men-
tioned case the court used the word "condonation" rather than
"reconciliation." The latter not only is correct under Article
152 of the Civil Code, which uses the word "reconciliation," but
also better conveys the idea that the mere failure to sever the
common life is not sufficient to constitute the operative fact
which extinguishes causes for separation and divorce. "To con-
done" often is used in common speech as the equivalent of "to
tolerate," but "to become reconciled" always implies the deci-
sion to continue or to resume the common life in spite of the
existence of a cause for separation or divorce. Judging from
the opinion in the case under discussion, the attorney for plain-
tiff-appellant apparently understood "condonation" in the sense
of its everyday meaning as explained above. Perhaps the
Supreme Court's use of "condonation" rather than "reconcilia-
tion" in previous decisions contributed to the difficulty in this
case. If so, the reason for the court's adherence to the proper
terminology is all the more important to obviate the recurrence
of such incidents.
17. 223 La. 357, 65 So. 2d 794 (1953).
18. 66 So. 2d 335 (La. 1953).
19. 221 La. 1033, 61 So. 2d 730 (1952).
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MARRIAGE
The decisions on the subject of marriage involved only well
understood points of law and the real issues therefore were
primarily fact issues. Bloom v. Willis, 20 Succession of Fields,21
and Succession of St. Amand22 each dealt with the correctness
of the lower court's findings on the existence or non-existence
of a marriage. In the second of the named cases there was
also the question of the existence of a putative marriage and this
was disposed of on the basis of standing interpretations of the
Civil Code. These decisions do not require discussion.
ALImONY
In Wilmot v. Wilmot 3 a divorced husband and father sought
to be relieved of his alimentary obligations to his wife and the
two children in her custody on the ground they had left the
state and established a domicile in Tennessee. The court looked
to Section 457 of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws for
guidance and followed it in deciding in favor of the wife and
children. At the time of the suit and judgment in the trial court
there was no Louisiana legislation on this subject. It may be
well to note, however, that in 1952 Revised Statutes 13:1601-
1609,24 a variation of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, 5 was enacted. This legislation primarily estab-
lishes a procedure for enforcing alimentary obligations between
persons in Louisiana and other states, but necessarily implies
that a Louisianian can have alimentary obligations toward non-
Louisiana domiciliaries. 6
20. 221 La. 803, 60 So. 2d 415 (1952).
21. 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952).
22. 223 La. 319, 65 So. 2d 780 (1953).
23. 223 La. 221, 65 So. 2d 321 (1953) and a second suit between the same
parties, 223 La. 250, 65 So. 2d 330 (1953), were consolidated for trial and the
two disposed of with one opinion rendered in the first.
24. La. Act 492 of 1952.
25. 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 43-65 (1953 Supplement).
26. It may not be idle to ask what state has legislative jurisdiction (that
is, what state's law is applicable) in support cases. The mere fact that the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws has its theory and that Louisiana and
other states have taken stands in their jurisprudence and legislation mean
nothing in themselves if, as the writer contends, the determination of the
limits of the legislative jurisdiction of states is ultimately within the com-
petency of the U. S. Congress or Supreme Court by reason of the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. See this Symposium,
p. 163 infra. The writer, however, is not prepared at this time to discuss this
matter in relation to alimony law. It requires more careful study than he
has been able to give to it.
19531
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It is necessary to state the essential facts in Wainright v.
Wainright27 to render discussion of it intelligible. A divorced
wife obtained a judgment for past due and future alimony.
The husband appealed. While the appeal was pending he filed
another suit asking that the original judgment in the alimony
proceedings be declared null on the ground the wife was now
working and no longer in need. The lower court dismissed the
suit, saying the same judgment was up on appeal and undis-
posed of. The Supreme Court affirmed this action, saying that
a suit for reduction of alimony had not been filed. Clearly there
is substantial injustice here, even if the husband's attorneys
misunderstood the law and used the wrong procedure. It is
true that once alimony payments become due under a judg-
ment they remain collectible, no matter how much the condition
of the parties may change. To the extent, therefore, that the
"suit for nullity" would have sought cancellation of the obliga-
tion to pay past due alimony it was unfounded. This should have
been clear to counsel in the first place. But there can be no
doubt this "suit for nullity" contained a request to reduce or
eliminate alimony payments for the future, as is authorized by
Article 232 of the Civil Code, and it is difficult to understand
why it should not have been regarded as such in spite of the
improper terminology and classification of the suit by the plain-
tiff's attorneys. Besides, it is certainly incorrect to imply, as
the trial judge and the Supreme Court did, that changes in
circumstances, warranting a change in, the specification of the
alimentary obligation and occurring after the judgment below,
may be considered on the appeal of that judgment. The appeal
properly can consider only the correctness of the judgment
rendered by the trial court in the light of the facts as they
existed at that time. New circumstances may be considered
only in a new suit to reduce or cancel alimony. In the writer's
opinion, the "suit for nullity" should have been treated as such
a new suit.
The remaining alimony decisions were of lesser interest.
In Leager v. Leager2 8 the Supreme Court once more had to de-
clare the obvious, that under Article 148 of the Civil Code a
wife is entitled to alimony pending suit for separation or di-
27. 221 La. 787, 60 So. 2d 410 (1952).
28. Two cases between the same parties, 222 La. 301, 62 So. 2d 492 (1952)
and 222 La. 309, 62 So. 2d 494 (1952), were consolidated for trial and dis-
position.
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vorce, be she at fault or not. It is inexcusable for attorneys
to contend otherwise in the face of the clear language of Article
148. It is a waste of the court's time and probably often of a
client's money. Richards v. Garth,29 Davieson v. Trapp,30 and
Breffeilh v. Breffeilh3 ' all were concerned with what is "fault"
within Article 160 of the Civil Code, limiting the divorced wife's
right to alimony to instances in which she has not been at fault,
and the proof of absence of fault. It was said in both of the
first two mentioned cases that the wife must establish her free-
dom from fault, but it is not clear from the decisions that she,
and not the husband, had been made to bear the burden of
convincing the court.
DISAVOWAL OF PATERNITY
Feazel v. Feazel32 is another decision in the tradition of
Eloi v. Mader and Succession of Saloy, of infamous memory.33
A husband sought to disavow a child born to his wife eleven
and a half months after they were separated in fact. The opin-
ion states that the husband of the mother is the father of the
child unless he proves that his remoteness from the wife made
their cohabitation impossible (citing Article 189) or that the
Wife committed adultery and concealed the birth of the child
from the husband (citing Article 185), then proceeds to find
neither remoteness nor concealment of birth, and finally in
effect declares the husband the father of the child conceived
during the separation in fact of the spouses. The legislation
does not support this result.
Articles 184-192 of the Civil Code, on legitimacy resulting
from marriage, are not automatically applicable in every case
in which the child is found to have been conceived or born of
a married woman. If they were, they would be in conflict with
29. 223 La. 117, 65 So. 2d 109 (1953).
30. 66 So. 2d 804 (La. 1953).
31. 221 La. 843, 60 So. 2d 457 (1952).
In this case the Supreme Court, Justice Hamiter dissenting, permitted
the wife to withdraw her reconventional demand for alimony after trial
and before judgment. See the discussion of this point by McMahon in this
symposium, p. 202 infra.
32. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
33. Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581 (La. 1841), and Succession of Saloy, 44 La.
Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892) in each of which children born to a married
woman while she was living openly in adultery rather than with her hus-
band were deemed the legitimate children of the husband because he had
not disavowed them. These cases have been followed ever since without
exception.
1953]
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Article 197, in the chapter on proof of legitimate filiation. This
article in no indefinite terms makes it clear that in some in-
stances legitimate filiation may be disproved, even if it is estab-
lished that the child was born of a married woman, by show-
ing that her husband is not its father. French doctrine inter-
preting similar articles has long recognized that the presump-
tion of legitimacy, resulting from the fact of conception or birth
from a married woman and necessitating an action of disavowal
to rebut it, exists only where the person whose legitimacy is
in question has enjoyed the reputation of being a legitimate
child.3 4 What would prevent the child from enjoying this repu-
tation? Certainly the wife's open adulterous concubinage, or
rearing the children under a surname other than her husband's,
or her taking pains to hide her pregnancy and the birth of a
child from her acquaintances should be sufficient causes, for
these are all acts which attest to the facts and lead men to
attribute paternity to another than the husband. Indeed this
is the clear implication of Articles 195 and 196. 3 5 In such states
34. See Comment, 13 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587, 597 (1953) and also
2 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 pratique de droit civil frangais n. 813-816 (2 ed.
1952). The author of the comment above cited lists as "another possible
interpretation" of Article 197 that the person contesting legitimacy may
prove the child "is not the child of the husband of the mother in the
sense that the mother was not married to the alleged father at the time
of his birth or conception." 13 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587, 598. The present
writer cannot accept that view. In reducing the article to a provision author-
izing proof that the alleged parents were not married to each other it gives
it no special role at all,'for the non-existence of a marriage between parents
may always be shown. That is a question of marriage, not of legitimacy,
though the finding of non-marriage between parents may reduce a child to
illegitimacy. Besides, it seems that if the redactors of the article had
intended to say that the non-marriage of the alleged parents could be
proven they could have expressed this more directly. The very wording
of Article 197, on the other hand, indicates that it is concerned with biologi-
cal filiation; and, inasmuch as the article is to be found in the chapter
"On Legitimate Children," it must be concerned with the biological filiation
between a child and persons married to each other, the indispensable con-
ditions for legitimacy. In other words, the assumption of Article 197 must
be that the "husband of the mother" referred to is her husband at the time
of the child's conception.
35. Art. 195, La. Civil Code of 1870. "The being considered in this ca-
pacity is proved by a sufficient collection of facts demonstrating the con-
nection of filiation and paternity which exists between an individual and
the family to which he belongs.
"The most material of these facts are:
"That such individual has always been called by the surname of the
father from whom he pretends to be born;
"That the father treated him as his child, and that he provided as such
for his education, maintenance and settlement in life;
"That he has constantly been acknowledged as such in the world;
"That he has been acknowledged as such within the family."
Art. 196. "If there be neither register of birth or baptism, nor this
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of affairs there is no occasion for disavowal of the child for
there is no reputation of legitimacy to destroy. The child must
in such instances prove his legitimacy and even if he goes so
far as to prove his mother was a married woman anyone in-
terested may prove that he was not the child of that woman's
husband. This interpretation renders Articles 184-192 and Article
197 in harmony; it also is more consistent with what persons
would ordinarily expect the law on this subject to be; and this
harmony and this consistency indicate the correctness of this
interpretation and recommend its acceptance.
Whether or not under the facts of the Feazel case it could
have been said that the child did not enjoy a reputation of
legitimacy, rendering it unnecessary for the husband of the
mother to initiate an action of disavowal, need not be answeredse
The fact is that the husband did initiate an action to disavow
the child, and with cause, for in instances of the birth of a child
three hundred or more days following a voluntary separation
the husband may disavow paternity simply by proving that he
and his wife had not cohabited at any time of possible concep-
tion. While preparing these remarks it occurred to the writer
for the first time that this is the meaning of Civil Code Article
188, paragraph two, if it is to be given any effect at all. This
paragraph states that "in case of voluntary separation, cohabi-
tation is always presumed, unless the contrary be proved." Why
prove non-cohabitation if this has no bearing on the right to
disavow? Unless this paragraph means that non-cohabitation
during a period of voluntary separation is a cause for disavowal
it means nothing.
The correctness of this interpretation can be demonstrated
general reputation, or if the child has been registered under a false name,
or as born of unknown parents, also if the child has been exposed or aban-
doned, or if his condition has been suppressed, the proof of his legitimate
filiation may be made either by written or oral evidence."
36. The French court of Cassatlon has refused to admit of the possi-
bility of a reputation of illegitimacy in the face of a birth certificate indi-
cating legitimacy. Civ. 26 Oct. 1927, D.1928,1,65, S.1929,1,209. In the Feazel
case the wife had left Louisiana and gone to Missouri to have her child.
There she registered it, naming her husband as the father. The husband,
however, did not know of the pregnancy or birth until later. Can it be said
that this registry gave the child an appearance of legitimate status suffi-
cient to overcome other indications to the contrary? The writer would
think that the wife's use of the husband's name in such instances probably
resulted more from the shame of admitting her adultery than the belief
her husband was the father of the child. To permit this one factor of the
registration to overcome a reputation of illegitimacy, if otherwise estab-
lished, would be permitting a fraud on the law.
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easily in the context of the whole Article 188. The first para-
graph states that "The legitimacy of the child born three hun-
dred days after separation from bed and board . . . may be
contested, unless it be proved that there had been cohabitation
between the husband and wife . .. ." The second paragraph adds
"But in case of voluntary separation, cohabitation is always pre-
sumed, unless the contrary be proved." Thus the import of the
whole article must be as if it read as follows:
The child born three hundred days after either a separation
from bed and board or a separation in fact may be contested.
If the separation be one from bed and board, that in itself
is cause for disavowal unless it be proved that there has
been cohabitation between the spouses.
But, if the separation be voluntary, then the husband must
prove there has not been any cohabitation between the
spouses.
In this case the two necessary elements, the birth of the child
more than three hundred days after a voluntary separation and
the non-cohabitation of the spouses were both proved and the
judgment should have been one of disavowal.87
For too long decisions in this field of legitimate filiation
have been contrary to the obvious biological facts and the com-
mon sense judgment of men. They have plagued our jurispru-
dence and our legislation and made them objects of ridicule.
Legislative reforms were not forthcoming probably not so much
because of satisfaction with the decisions as because the very
persons who are affected by them do not learn of the law's
interpretation until they have been caught irrevocably and
forever denied the possibility of having their particular situa-
tions changed. But there really is no need for a change in the
legislation. It is only necessary for the Supreme Court to recog-
nize the true meaning of the existing law at the first oppor-
tunity. It can do this by recognizing (1) that non-cohabitation
during voluntary separation is itself a cause for disavowal under
Article 188, (2) that Articles 184-192 are not applicable and
37. It may be noted that the French Civil Code of 1804 did not have a
counterpart to Article 184 of the Louisiana Civil Code. A provision similar
to paragraph one of Article 188 was added by the Law of 6 Dec. 1850, but
there is even today no provision similar to paragraph two of Article 188
in the French law. Thus the failure of French courts and commentators to
recognize voluntary separation and non-cohabitation as a cause for dis-
avowal is of no significance for our law.
[VOL. XIV
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no disavowal is necessary if the child does not enjoy the repu-
tation of having legitimate status, and (3) that where the child
does not enjoy the reputation of legitimacy all interested per-
sons may defend themselves against his claims, even by proving
that he is not the child of the husband of his mother.
There are two other scores on which the writer cannot
agree with the decision in the Feazel case. The husband sought
to prove adultery of the wife and "concealment of the birth
from him," itself a ground for disavowal even where the spouses
are living together.38  The court upheld the trial judge's refusal
to find either adultery or concealment. On the adultery issue
the trial judge apparently with reason failed to believe the
testimony of the single third party witness. This left only the
testimony of the defendant wife, given by way of answers
to interrogatories on deposition, in which she admitted (1) she
had never at any time consummated her marriage with her
husband and (2) she had given birth to a child eleven and a
half months after she and her husband separated in fact. The
Supreme Court seemed to doubt this could be an admission
of adultery, but in addition stated both (a) such testimony, if
regarded as an admission, could not be considered proof of
adultery because of the absence of corroborative evidence and
(b) a married woman cannot be allowed to "bastardize" her
child. The writer has great difficulty with both (a) and (b).
It would seem that the birth of a child to a wife eleven and a
half months after separation in fact would sufficiently cor-
roborate her confession of adultery. 9 On the question of whether
a mother may admit the illegitimacy of her child, let it be
observed that the court cited only earlier precedents, none of
which find the least support in our legislation. The court was
merely perpetrating the errors of its predecessors, all of which
stem from the misconception of Articles 184-197, as previously
explained. Articles 184-192 do establish a presumption of legiti-
macy where indications of irregularity in the conception of
38. Art. 185, La. Civil Code of 1870.
39. It may be noted that modern French jurisprudence interpreting
Article 313 of the French Civil Code, which- is identical with our Article
185, does not consider the proof of adultery essential at all. When proven,
adultery becomes an evidentiary fact corroborating the indication of irregu-
larity (or adultery) in the conception of the child which itself results from
the concealment of his birth from the husband. Thus in such cases proof
of the concealment of the birth is sufficient in and of itself for disavowal.
This seems more logical than our Louisiana view. See 2 Planiol et Ripert,
Trait6 pratique de droit civil frangais n. 85 (2 ed. 1952).
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the child are absent, but there is nothing in the articles to imply
that we must shut our eyes to the obvious immorality of life
in our times to such an extent as both to impose unjustly on
a man the status and obligations of legitimate paternity, with
all they imply in terms of alimony and succession, and to add
insult to injury by stamping him officially with the mark of
the cuckold. This cannot but produce a feeling of contempt for
both legislation and the administration of justice.
ADOPTION
The validity of certain acts of adoption were questioned in
two appeals. In Succession of Thompson40 it was claimed that
an act of adoption was invalid, though executed before a notary
public, because not executed in authentic form. The act had
been executed in 1943, and therefore under Act 169 of 1940, the
legislation still in effect as Revised Statutes 9:461. This act
provides only for "a notarial act signed by the adoptive parent
or parents and the person to be adopted," and the opinion
analyzes the history of adoption legislation in Louisiana to find
that just such an act and not one in authentic form was con-
templated by the Legislature.
In Succession of Pizzillo4 l an act of adoption executed during
the life of Act 31 of 1872 as amended by Act 48 of 1924 was
attacked both because it had not been executed in authentic
form, though before a notary, and because the blood parent had
not signed the act. The court was able to point out that Section
13 of Act 46 of 1932, itself now superseded, 42 expressly limited
the attack on adoption acts on such grounds to six months after
that date.
The case of Ball v. Campbe 11 4 was before the Supreme Court
for the second and third times. In the second opinion the sub-
ject was the authority of the Supreme Court under its super-
visory jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition
to a juvenile court in an adoption proceeding, and this was
affirmed. In the third opinion the court dismissed as not proved
the contention of the blood mother that she had been coerced
into surrendering her child for adoption. It also decided that
40. 221 La. 791, 60 So. 2d 411 (1952).
41. 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953).
42. The current legislation is La. R.S. 1950, 9:461-462.
43. Two opinions, 222 La. 357, 62 So. 2d 511 (1952) and' 222 La. 399, 62
So. 2d 621 (1952).
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the surrender was valid under Act 91 of 1942, now superseded,
though made to an agency "approved" but not "licensed" by
the State Department of Public Welfare, because the act by
its very language did not require more than "approval." The
current legislation, however, requires licensing rather than mere
approval.44
The most interesting issue raised in any of the adoption
cases was that of the possibility of revoking an adoption by
mutual consent of the adopter and adopted. In Succession of
Thompson45 the court ruled this was impossible. The explana-
tion given was that adoption created a status similar to that
of legitimate filiation, that like legitimate filiation adoption
gives rise to forced heirship, and that nothing in the law author-
izes the termination of forced heirship by agreement. There
being no legislation on this subject, the decision must be re-
garded as having been founded on Article 21 of the Civil Code,
which directs the judge to resort to natural law and reason
when the legislation is inadequate. The writer is not prepared
to say whether the decision reflects what should be the law
on this subject. It is a matter which warrants careful study.
Undoubtedly the possibility of terminating an adoption might
itself give rise to tensions which would weaken the relation-
ship, just as the very possibility of divorce leads to thoughts
thereof on occasion of domestic unrest and thereby itself be-
comes the major cause for divorce. The adoption of minors
especially would seem to warrant the same treatment as legiti-
mate filiation. Perhaps there is less reason to require this
identity of treatment in the case of adoption of majors, but
even here it would seem preferable to maintain the relation-
ship to prevent adopted or adopter from seeking to terminate
to the prejudice of the other a status which proves less desirable
or more burdensome than he had contemplated.
TUTORSHIP AND CUSTODY
A very fundamental question was raised in Wilmot v. Wil-
Mot,46 previously considered in another connection. After a
divorce the wife had been awarded custody of the children of
the marriage. Sometime later she filed a motion in the same
44. By La. R.S. 1950, 9:401-405.
45. 221 La. 791, 60 So. 2d 411 (1952).
46. 223 La. 221, 65 So. 2d 321 (1953).
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proceedings to have the husband show cause why she should
not be permitted to remove her domicile to Tennessee and take
the children there with her to live. The lower court amended
the previous custody judgment "so as to provide that Mrs. Wil-
mot is given the right to remove herself and the two children
to Nashville, Tennessee," and the Supreme Court affirmed this
judgment and decree in similar language. Both the very fact
the wife filed such a motion for a rule and the character of
the language used in the decision indicate the proceedings
were conducted and disposed of on the assumption that per-
mission to move was required and that the court could have
denied it. This appreciation of the law is different from that evi-
denced in previous cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed
the right of a natural tutor to take a child with him when he
moved out of the state.47 It is even at variance with language
used in a 1936 decision and quoted with approval by the Su-
preme Court.48 To affirm the latter approach is not at all to
deny that the husband and father or other interested party
could have requested a redetermination of the question of cus-
tody if he believed that the removal of the children from the
state would have been seriously detrimental to their welfare; 49
but this is not at all the same thing as saying that one who has
been given custody of a child may not take the child with him
to a new place of domicile out of the state without receiving
permission so to do.
There is indeed no legislation which is applicable to this
situation. The issue therefore must be disposed of on other bases
consistent with natural law and reason, all as required by
Article 21 of the Civil Code. The writer believes that a sound
approach to this kind of problem would be to regard the award
of custody as the creation of a status which then continues in
effect until terminated naturally or by judicial action for cause,
either in this state or in the state in which the custodian and
child are then domiciled or found. Certainly it would seem
47. Delacroix v. Boisblanc, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 715 (La. 1817); Robins v.
Weeks, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 379 (La. 1827); Bailey v. Morrison, 4 La. Ann. 523
(1849); Nunez v. Acosta, 184 La. 211, 165 So. 716 (1936). See also Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 184 La. 689, 167 So. 191 (1936) and Sanford v. Sanford, 208 La.
1073, 24 So. 2d 145 (1945).
48. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 184 La. 689, 167 So. 191 (1936), quoted at 65 So.
2d 321, 327 (La. 1953).
49. This right to redetermine custody on the basis of new circumstances
was affirmed in two cases decided during the 1952-53 term and cited infra
note 53.
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that an award of custody properly made would have to be given
full faith and credit in other states until a new award were
made for cause.50 There could then be no question of the right
of a custodian to take a child to another jurisdiction to live
and therefore there would be a rule of law much more con-
sistent with what one ordinarily would expect in such circum-
stances.
Other custody pronouncements followed familiar patterns.
The Supreme Court continued to interpret Article 157 of the
Civil Code to mean that the mother is to be preferred to the
father in custody cases, except where she is morally unfit, in-
capable of caring for the children, or mistreats them, whether
or not she has been awarded the divorce or separation. 1 Per-
haps the dictum on the subject in Wilmot v. Wilmot is the strong-
est statement yet made about it. 5 2 In two decisions the court
affirmed the possibility of redetermining the custody issue after
changes in circumstances of the parents and the children.55
There is no express legislation on this subject covering instances
not involving serious danger to the physical or moral welfare
of the children,5 4 and these decisions seem to be wise applica-
tions of the authority granted judges under Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Finally, in one instance, the court explained again
that the juvenile courts do not have jurisdiction in custody
cases unless the child is "neglected." 5
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